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Xunzi would presumably have replied simply that a white horse is commonly called a "horse." The classical period of Chinese philosophy ended about 200 BCE. The next important movement, the neo-Daoism of the third and fourth centuries CE, revived the study of the sophists and the Moist "Canons." Indian treatises on logic were available in translation from the seventh century on; Buddhists wrote commentaries on them during the Tang dynasty (6181279), entirely neglected logical inquiry. The second fallacy, "confusing names by misuse of objects," was exemplified by "Our genuine desires are few." Xunzi criticized this as a factual error about humankind. The third fallacy is "confusing objects by misuse of names." Kung-sun Lung (born 380 BCE) had defended the sophism "A (white) horse is not a horse" on grounds which assume that the question is one of identity, not one of class membership. 7: The Social Background, Part 1: Language and Logic in Traditional China.
It is therefore not surprising that Chinese thinkers have cared little for the forms of reasoning, except under the pressure of the acute controversies of the third century BCE. Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1978; reprinted, 2003. Thus, "same" is (1) identical ("two names for one object"), (2) belonging to one body, (3) together, and (4) of a kind ("the same in some respects").The Moist Ta-ch' further refined the classification of names."Private" names (for example, the proper name "Tsang") apply to one object.Whether a name fits an object is decided by appeal to a "standard." There may be more than one standard for an object; for "circle" the standard may be a circle, one's mental picture of a circle, or a compass.